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Abstract 
This paper introduces a game theoretic model of groundwater extraction in a two-cell aquifer 
under incomplete information. A novel assumption is that individual users have incomplete 
knowledge of the speed of lateral flows in the aquifer: although a user is aware that his 
neighbor’s water use has some influence on his future water stock, he is uncertain about the 
degree of this impact.  We find that the lack of information may either increase or decrease the 
rate of water use and welfare.  In a two-period framework, the relevant characteristic is the ratio 
of the periodic marginal benefits of water use.  Depending on whether this ratio is convex or 
concave, the average speed with which the aquifer is depleted decreases or increases when users 
learn more about the local hydrologic properties of groundwater.  In principle, welfare may 
decrease even in cases when the groundwater allocation is closer to the efficient groundwater 
allocation.  
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1. Introduction 
In a seminal article, Gisser and Sanchez (GS) [10] found that the welfare gain from 
groundwater management policies is likely to be negligible. GS analytically obtained the 
infinite-horizon trajectory of water use from competitive (open access) pumping, as well as the 
optimal control trajectory that maximizes users’ discounted welfare. Applying a computable 
version of their model to the Pecos Basin in New Mexico, GS calculated that the welfare 
difference in the two trajectories, representing the gain from optimal management, was on the 
order of 0.01%. Intrigued by this result, several researchers applied the GS model to other 
regions, often with refinements allowing for more detailed user responses to resource depletion. 
Across a wide range of settings and behavioral assumptions, the findings in these studies were 
generally similar to those of GS.
1
  
Another related line of research relaxed GS’s assumption of an openly accessed aquifer. 
As Negri [17] pointed out, this assumption does not hold for most aquifers; access to 
groundwater usually is restricted because of the need for users to acquire the overlying land as 
well as a water right. Negri [17], Dixon [5], and Provencher and Burt [21] developed dynamic 
game-theoretic models of groundwater use in a restricted access setting. Competitive pumping 
levels in these models were derived as a Nash equilibrium in closed-loop strategies, where each 
user takes the decision rules of his rivals as given. This line of research identified the precise 
individual incentives leading to welfare losses.
2
  
Yet another line of research replaced the simple “bathtub aquifer” in GS’s model with a 
more accurate depiction of groundwater hydrology. The bathtub or single cell aquifer model 
assumes instantaneous lateral flow of groundwater, so that consumption by one user has an 
immediate and equal impact on the water available to other users. In reality, the speed of lateral 
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flow (known as aquifer transmissivity) is quite slow on average, but depends on a number of 
spatially variable aquifer features. Thus, a spatially explicit model is required to accurately 
portray groundwater availability over time. Extending earlier work [3,19], Brozovic [4] solved 
the social planner’s problem with spatially disbursed users and finite transmissivity. Dynamically 
optimal extraction rates were found to be highly variable spatially, a result with important policy 
implication that the GS model could not reveal. However, the common property equilibrium in 
this setting was not addressed. 
 In this paper, we build on both the game theoretic and spatial groundwater models, while 
focusing on an issue not previously addressed in the groundwater literature. Namely, our aim is 
to determine the role of incomplete information about aquifer transmissivity in shaping the 
common property equilibrium and its attendant welfare losses. While users in most aquifers are 
surely aware that their water availability depends on the extraction histories at nearby wells, they 
are unlikely to know the degree of these impacts with precision. Due to the geologic variability 
noted above, even hydrologic scientists have limited data on transmissivity at specific locations.  
Moreover, it would be difficult for an individual user to infer local transmissivity from observed 
water levels and pumping rates at nearby wells, as these rates are private information.  
We construct a game-theoretic, restricted access model, where use at one well affects 
future water availability at the neighboring well depending on the (unknown) aquifer 
transmissivity. Extreme possibilities are that the aquifer is a “bathtub” with infinite 
transmissivity and that it consists of independent aquifers (cells) with no lateral flows. To 
sharpen the analysis, we employ the simplest possible setting with the essential features, which 
has two periods and two symmetric users. We then isolate the effect of incomplete information 
on: (a) the equilibrium rate of extraction, and (b) the welfare loss due to the common pool nature 
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of the resource. These effects are determined by comparing the Nash solution under incomplete 
information to the socially efficient solution and to the Nash outcome under complete 
information. 
We find that better information may either increase or decrease the equilibrium 
withdrawal rate, and also may either increase or decrease equilibrium welfare. Moreover, it is 
possible that better information brings the withdrawal rate closer to the efficient level but 
nevertheless causes welfare to fall. We establish that the direction of impact from better 
information depends on a specific curvature property of users’ net benefit functions.   
Our results fit within the broader literature on the effects of information on equilibrium 
outcomes. It is well known that more information may not improve welfare if it decreases the 
scope of risk-sharing opportunities among the agents in the economy.
3
  This result occurs 
because under better (private or public) information about the environment, not only does 
decision-making become better tailored to circumstances, but the set of feasible choices may also 
become constrained. Our line of inquiry is also related to the literature on experimentation and 
learning in the multi-agent setting.  For example, Harrington [12] explores price-setting behavior 
in the context of a duopoly in which firms are uncertain about the degree of product 
differentiation.  He finds that firms’ incentive to acquire more information about the extent of 
product differentiation (i.e. a potential externality imposed by the firms on each other) depends 
on their prior beliefs.  In contrast, we consider the case of a dynamic externality. 
Although this paper presents a model of groundwater use, our findings apply to other 
common property resources (such as fish, wildlife, or oil) where spatially distributed users are 
uncertain about the degree to which the resource is non-exclusive.  In the case of groundwater, 
exclusivity depends on aquifer transmissivity, while for fisheries it is determined by the rates of 
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biomass dispersal across space [22].  In general, better public information amplifies (or lessens) 
the tragedy of the commons and decreases (increases) social welfare when, upon observing the 
signal, the agents revise upward (downward) the extent to which the resource is non-exclusive 
and is shared among them. The goal of this paper is to formalize this trade-off and establish 
conditions under which the effect of better public information about the resource extraction and 
social welfare is unambiguous. 
 
 
2. Model 
 
 There are two periods, 2,1t , and two identical users (farmers), 2,1i .  The model of 
the aquifer is depicted in Figure 1.  In the beginning of period 1, the stocks of groundwater on 
each farm, 1,ix , 2,1i  are the same.  In what follows, the first symbol, i, in double subscripts on 
variables identifies the farm and the second, t, identifies the period; single subscripts of functions 
denote first derivatives.  For concreteness, we normalize the initial stocks of groundwater to 
unity, 11,21,1  xx .  Let tiu ,  denote the amount of groundwater pumped on farm i  in period t .  
The amount that can be used for irrigation on each farm cannot exceed that farm’s groundwater 
stock: 
(1) titi xu ,,   for 2,1t  and 2,1i .   
For simplicity, we assume no aquifer recharge, although recharge could easily be incorporated in 
the analysis and would not change the qualitative nature of our results.   
[ Figure 1 about here] 
2.1 Lateral groundwater flows 
Condition (1) above distinguishes our model from the standard common property setting, 
as it assumes groundwater is essentially a private resource within each irrigation season:  farmer i 
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cannot access the groundwater lying beneath farm j within a given period. This assumption 
reflects the spatial separation of the wells and the notion that groundwater flows too slowly for 
the extractions to interact within seasons. Extraction at each well creates a “cone of depression” 
in the groundwater surface that grows wider and deeper as more water is extracted during the 
irrigation season. However, this extraction period is typically much shorter than the recovery 
period between seasons, during which the cones are eliminated by lateral flow. For example, in 
the High Plains aquifer region, irrigation withdrawals for summer crops last about 75 days (mid-
June to late August), leaving about a 9.5-month recovery period. Our assumption of intra-
seasonally private use presumes either that neighboring cones of depression do not overlap or 
that the resulting intra-seasonal flow across farms is negligible.  
Between periods 1 and 2, groundwater will flow toward the well with the greater 
extraction in period 1. In particular, the inter-period flow of groundwater from farm 2 to farm 1 
is given by Darcy’s law: 
))1()1(( 1,21,1 uuQ   )( 1,21,1 uu  , 
where  ]5.0,0[  summarizes the hydrological properties of the region, )( 1,11,1 ux   
)( 1,21,2 ux  1,21,1 uu   is the hydraulic gradient (the difference in hydraulic head between 
wells).
4
  The flow of groundwater from farm 1 to farm 2 is Q .  The stocks of groundwater 
available in period 2 are 
(2) 1,21,11,12,1 )1(11 uuQux   , 1,21,11,22,2 )1(11 uuQux   . 
While groundwater is always an intra-seasonally private property resource, 5.0  corresponds 
to the inter-seasonally common property resource because it implies that groundwater levels are 
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equalized across farms in period 2, 2,22,1 xx  , for any pumping in period 1, while 0  
corresponds to the purely private resource. 
 
2.2 Benefits of groundwater use 
 
The net benefits of water use on each farm is given by  
(3)  ( , ) ( ) ( , )  g u x v py u c u x k , 
where p  is the per unit price of the crop, y  is yield, c  is the cost of pumping groundwater, k  is 
the cost of other farming inputs, and v is a utility-of-income function. An empirically estimated 
specification of (4) is provided in Peterson and Ding [20].  In the analysis that follows, the 
curvature properties of g will play a central role. In general, these properties are inherited both 
from the utility function, v, and from the income function, r(u,x) = y(u) – c(u,x) – k.  
To understand the relevant curvature conditions, it will be helpful to consider examples 
where either utility or income is linear, so that there is no ambiguity about the source of the 
curvature of g. Thus, in some of the examples in later sections, v is specified linearly (i.e., 
farmers are risk neutral) and the source of curvature is from the yield and cost functions; in other 
examples v is concave and farmers are risk averse, while the yield and cost functions are linear. 
The latter examples provide helpful intuition about the relevant curvature properties, as they can 
be related to standard indicators of risk preferences. Throughout, we assume that g is strictly 
increasing, strictly concave, twice differentiable over the relevant domain, and has the property 
that (0, ) 0g    and (0, )ug    .
5
   
 
2.3 Information about the hydrology of the region 
 
We distinguish between two information regimes.  Under complete information, in period 1 
farmers know with certainty the “speed” of lateral groundwater flow,  .  Under incomplete 
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information, in period 1 farmers view ~  as a random variable and only know its probability 
distribution, )()~Pr(  H , where H represents the variation in geologic conditions 
throughout the aquifer.
6
 In the latter case, information is assumed to be symmetric across 
farmers, so that their subjective probabilities, H, are identical.  
Farmers maximize the sum of discounted per period profits: 
(4) ),()1,( 2,2,1, iii xugug   subject to (1) and (2), 
where 1  is the discount factor.  Let )( i  and ( [ ])i E   denote the maximum expected 
profits attained ex ante by the non-cooperating farmers, 2,1i , respectively under complete and 
incomplete information about the hydrology of the region.   
 
3. Social planner 
Before we turn to the analysis of equilibrium groundwater use, we characterize the efficient 
allocation.  We assume that social planner has perfect information about  .  Conditional on  , 
the planner’s problem is to maximize joint profits by choosing stiu , , 2,1i , 2,1t : 
(5) 
1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2
,1 ,2 ,21,2, , ,
max ( ,1) ( , )
s s s s
s s
i i iiu u u u
g u g u x

  subject to (1) and (2). 
Let  
(6) 
( ,1)
( )
( (1 ,1 ) (1 ,1 ))

    
u
u x
g u
f u
g u u g u u
 
denote the ratio of the marginal benefits of water, and 1( )f    denote the inverse of f .  The 
(strict) concavity of g  implies that f  and its inverse are (strictly) decreasing.  Our first result 
shows that the efficient allocation of groundwater is independent of the speed of groundwater 
lateral flows (the extent to which the resource is public or private).   
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Proposition 1.  (Efficient pumping) The efficient intertemporal allocation of groundwater is 
independent of the speed of lateral flows, and is given by  
(7) 1,1( ) (1)
s
iu f
  ]5.0,0[ . 
Proof: First, note that in period 2, the planner optimally exhausts the remaining stock on each 
farm because g is strictly increasing in u. This symmetry implies that constraint (1) binds for t = 
2 (i.e., ui,2 = xi,2), so that (5) can be written 
(8) 
1,1 2,1
,1 ,2 ,21,2,
max ( ,1) ( , )
s s
s
i i iiu u
g u g x x

  subject to (1) and (2). 
Because (8) is symmetric and concave in su 1,1  and 
su 1,2 , optimality requires that 
su 1,1
su 1,2 .  
Because farms are identical, this implies that there are no lateral groundwater flows, 0Q  .  
Additionally, corner solutions are ruled out because g  is increasing and concave in each 
argument, 0,.)0( g , and ,.)0(ug . Substituting the law of motion (2), 1,2, 1 ii ux   for 
2,1i , into the objective function and differentiating, the first-order conditions for a maximum 
are  
(9) 0))1,1()1,1(()1,( 1,1,1,1,1, 
s
i
s
ix
s
i
s
iu
s
iu uuguugug  , or  
(10) ,1( ) 1
s
if u  . 
By the concavity of g, f is a strictly decreasing function, implying the existence of an inverse 
function, 1f . Applying this inverse function to (10) completes the proof. ■ 
Even though lateral flows are possible, Proposition 1 states that it is efficient to pump the 
same amount of groundwater on each farm because farms are symmetric.  This result implies that 
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detailed data on   are not needed to obtain the efficient solution. At the efficient solution, the 
average pumping of water use and farmer profits are 
 (11a) )]~([ 1, 
s
iuE 
5.0
0
1, )(dHu
s
i
1(1)f  ,  2,1i , 
(11b) )]~([  siE
1 1 1( (1),1) (1 (1),1 (1))g f g f f     , 2,1i . 
In this model, farmers’ profits are the only relevant portion of social welfare, because the price of 
the commodity produced, p, does not vary and consumers’ welfare remains constant. 
Additionally, symmetry implies that profits will be equal across farmers in both the efficient and 
equilibrium solutions (the latter are derived below). We therefore use the terms “producer 
profits” and “welfare” interchangeably throughout this article to refer to the income of the 
average farmer.  
The function f in equation (6) can be interpreted as a farmer’s intertemporal rate of 
substitution for water. The numerator represents the benefit of extracting and consuming the 
marginal unit in period 1, while the denominator is the discounted benefit of saving the marginal 
unit until period 2. The two terms in the parentheses of the denominator reflect the two types of 
benefits from saving: gu is the consumption value of the marginal unit extracted in period 2 and 
gx reflects the marginal reduction in pumping costs. Given this interpretation of f, condition (10) 
can be seen as an instance of a well known-result from consumption-savings problems: 
efficiency requires that agents’ intertemporal rate of substitution be set equal to the gross return 
on savings (i.e., 1 + r where r is the expected rate of return). From the planner’s perspective, the 
gross return on water saved in the aquifer is exactly one—a unit saved in period 1 is a unit 
available in period 2.    
In what follows, the inverse function 1f  and its curvature properties will play important 
roles.
7
 In the context of the planner’s problem, this function maps the gross rate of return on 
 12 
groundwater savings into the efficient amount of water consumed in period 1. The easiest case to 
interpret is when 1  and the water benefits depend only on water use, u, and are independent 
of the groundwater stock. Under these assumptions, f (u) = gu(u)/gu(1–u). Function f then attains 
a value of 1 when u = 0.5, or equivalently, )1(1f 5.0 . Thus, in the case where pumping costs 
are unaffected by the stock level and 1 , the efficient solution distributes the available water 
equally across the two periods. 
As will be shown below, the same function 1f  emerges from farmers’ individual 
decision problems in an unregulated equilibrium. In particular, a farmer’s individually optimal 
consumption in period 1 can be computed by evaluating 1f  at the farmer’s rationally expected 
gross return on water saved in the aquifer.  
 
4. Equilibrium  
 
We proceed by first charactering equilibrium allocation under incomplete information.  The 
equilibrium under complete information is then obtained a special case of the incomplete 
information regime. Finally, we reveal the “tragedy of the commons effect” in our model, 
showing that pumping levels in both cases exceed the efficient level. 
 
4.1. Incomplete information 
 
In this section, we determine equilibrium pumping by both farmers when they know the 
probability distribution of the lateral flow speed, )(H , but not the local realization of 
]5.0,0[~ . 
In period 2, both farmers optimally exhaust the available stocks of underground water 
because g is increasing—i.e., 2,2, i
n
i xu  )
~(  for 2,1i .  Here superscript “n” stands for “no 
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information”.  Farmer i’s net benefits depend on decisions made in period 1 by virtue of the 
binding constraint (2); i.e., xi,2 )
~( = (1 – ~ )(1 – niu 1, ) +
~ (1 – nju 1, ).  The dependence of the 
groundwater stocks in period 2 on the speed of lateral flows introduces uncertainty into the 
farmers’ decisions problems.  And so, in period 1, farmer i  chooses niu 1,  to maximize  
(12) ( [ ])i E   )1,([max 1,
1,
n
iu
ugEn
i
))]~(),~(( 2,2,  ii xxg  subject to (1) and (2). 
Because the speed of lateral flows only affects period 2 profit, for a given nju 1, , the best response, 
n
iu 1, , by farmer ji   satisfies 
(13) )1,( 1,
n
iu ug 0)))]
~(),~(())~(),~(()(~1[( 2,2,2,2,   iixiiu xxgxxgE . 
The Nash equilibrium is a pair of pumping levels, ,1
n
iu  (i = 1, 2), that simultaneously satisfy 
equation (11).  
 
Proposition 2.  (Equilibrium pumping) If both farmers’ expected rate of lateral flow is [ ]E  , the 
Nash equilibrium pumping levels are symmetric and unique, and equal  
(14) 
1
,1( [ ]) (1 [ ])
n
iu E f E 
  , i = 1,2. 
Proof: We will first show that the equilibrium is symmetric. The best response conditions, 
equation (13), can be written 
1,1( ,1)
n
ug u 1,1 2,1[(1 ) (1 (1 ) )] 0
n nE q u u          
2,1( ,1)
n
ug u 2,1 1,1[(1 ) (1 (1 ) )] 0
n nE q u u         , 
where ),(),()( xxgxxgxq xu  .Without loss of generality, suppose the equilibrium were 
asymmetric with 1,1 2,1
n nu u .  Then we have 
 14 
)]~)~1(1()~1[()]~)~1(1()~1[()1,( 1,11,21,21,11,1
nnnnn
u uuqEuuqEug    
         )1,( 1,2
n
u ug  
The first inequality follows by assumption, 1,1 2,1
n nu u , and the concavity of q  (see footnote 5) .  
Note that 1,1 2,1
n nu u  implies that, for any )5.0,0[ , nn uu 1,21,1)1(1     
nn uu 1,11,2)1(1   , so that ))1(1())1(1( 1,11,21,21,1
nnnn uuquuq   , and hence 
))1(1()1())1(1()1( 1,11,21,21,1
nnnn uuquuq   .  Because the last inequality holds 
for any )5.0,0[ , taking the expectation over ~  does not change the sign of the inequality.  
We therefore have a contradiction since the concavity of g  implies that )1,()1,( 1,21,1
n
u
n
u ugug   
when 1,1 2,1
n nu u .  Hence, in any Nash equilibrium 1,1 2,1
n nu u .  Symmetry implies that the stock in 
period 2 simplifies to ,2 ( )ix   (1 – 
~ )(1 – niu 1, ) +
~ (1 – niu 1, ) = 1 – 
n
iu 1, . Substituting this 
relationship into (13), the best response condition becomes 
(15) )1,( 1,
n
iu ug 0))1,1()1,1((])
~[1( 1,1,1,1, 
n
i
n
ix
n
i
n
iu uuguugE  . 
By concavity of g , the left-hand side of (15) is decreasing in 
n
iu 1, .  Accordingly, equation (15) 
has a unique solution, niu 1, . By the definition of f, this unique solution also satisfies 
,1( ) 1 [ ]
n
if u E   ; applying the inverse function, 
1f  , to this equation completes the proof.  ■ 
The intuition for Proposition 2 is that each farmer anticipates a fraction, [ ]E  , of each 
unit of water he saves in period 1 will “escape” to beneath his rival’s farm by period 2. His 
rationally expected gross return on water saved is then 1 [ ]E  ,  giving him an incentive to 
increase period 1 consumption above the efficient level in equation (8). 
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In sum, the groundwater pumped in period 1 and welfare attained by non-cooperative 
farmers under incomplete information about the speed of lateral flow between the neighboring 
farms are  
(16a) ])~[(1, Eu
n
i
1(1 [ ]) f E , 
(16b) ]))~[1(1]),~[1(1()1]),~[1((])~[( 111  EfEfgEfgEi 
 . 
Next we consider the equilibrium under complete information. 
 
4.2. Complete information 
 
Equilibrium pumping under complete information about the speed of groundwater lateral flow, 
 , can be obtained as a special case of equilibrium characterized above by setting 1)~Pr(   
for some ]5.0,0[ . Applying (16a) and (16b), equilibrium pumping, ,1( )
c
iu  and equilibrium 
profits, i() under complete information are  
(17a) 1,1( ) (1 ) 
 ciu f .   
(17b) 1 1 1( ) ( (1 ),1) (1 (1 ),1 (1 ))i g f g f f     
         , 
where superscript “c” stands for “complete information”.  
To an observer who knows only the probability distribution of ~  over the aquifer, the 
average water pumped in period 1 and welfare attained by non-cooperative farmers with 
complete hydrologic information are  
(18a) )]~([ 1, 
c
iuE
0.5
1
0
(1 ) ( )   f dH , 
(18b)  )())]1(1),1(1()1),1(([)]~([ 11
5.0
0
1  dHffgfgE i 

 . 
Next we compare the non-cooperative equilibrium under both information regimes to the 
efficient solution. 
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4.3. Equilibrium and efficient allocations  
 
From the results above, it is straightforward to show that pumping levels in both information 
regimes will exceed the efficient level, ,1
s
iu , except in the unique case of no transmissivity. 
Formally, under incomplete information, ,1 ,1( [ ])
n s
i iu E u   if [ ] 0E   , while under complete 
information ,1 ,1( )
c s
i iu u   if  > 0.
8
  Thus, the familiar “tragedy of the commons” arises in this 
model regardless of the information regime. As should be expected, no externality results when 
users believe groundwater is a private resource.   
As one would also expect, the gap between the equilibrium and efficient extraction grows 
as (the expectation of)  becomes larger: the more common users perceive the resource to be, the 
faster the rate of withdrawal. This gap grows to its widest extent in “bathtub” situation 
[ ] 0.5E   , where users believe the aquifer to be a pure public resource.9 These results are 
depicted in Figure 2 for ),( xug 8.0u  and 1 .     
[Figure 2 about here]  
While these results establish that pumping rates exceed the efficient amount in both 
information regimes, it does not tell us how the pumping rates in the two regimes compare to 
each other.  To be precise, consider an aquifer where  varies according to the known 
distribution H.  If farmers are initially uninformed about the hydrology, we seek to understand 
how pumping rates and welfare would be affected if they all learned the precise local values of 
.  In analyzing this question, we obtain the main result of this article: the average speed with 
which the aquifer is depleted may either increase or decrease when users have better information 
about local hydrologic properties.  
 
5. Complete versus incomplete information 
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5.1. Average pumping rates 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that, on the one hand, the uncertainty about the 
speed of lateral groundwater flow – whether the resource is private or common – may provide a 
private incentive to pump less to safeguard against a possibly smaller stock in period 2.  On the 
other hand, this uncertainty may also create a private incentive to increase pumping, so as to 
capture more of the common stock.  The following proposition provides conditions under which 
farmers pump more (less) groundwater under incomplete information about the extent to which 
the resource is public.  
 
Proposition 3. (Information and pumping) Suppose that the ratio of the marginal benefits of 
groundwater in period 1 and 2 is convex (concave) in period 1 pumping, i.e., f    ( )0 .  Then 
non-cooperative farmers pump, on average, more (less) groundwater in period 1 under complete 
information about the speed of lateral flows, i.e., )]~([ 1, 
c
iuE  )( ])
~[(1, Eu
n
i . 
Proof: Using the inverse function theorem and differentiating twice yields, 
212 /)( xxf   311 )))((/())(( xffxff   .  This expression is non-negative (non-positive) 
depending on whether f   ( )0 , because, by assumption, 0f .  Then, using (16a) and (18a), 
Jensen’s inequality implies 
1
,1[ ( )] [ (1 )] ( )
c
iE u E f 
    1(1 [ ])f E    ])~[(1, Eu
n
i  
depending on whether ( ) ( )0f u    )]5.0(),1([ 11  ffu .  ■ 
 
And so, the curvature of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, )1,()( uguf u  
/ ( (1 ,1 )  ug u u ))1,1( uugx  , determines whether non-cooperative farmers pump, on 
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average, more or less groundwater under incomplete information about the speed of lateral 
flows. 
To develop the underlying intuition in Proposition 3, consider the case where f is 
concave. As shown above, the equilibrium pumping level under complete information depends 
on the realized value of , and can be identified geometrically as the point where f  = 1 . 
Thus, all the possible equilibrium points lie along the function f, corresponding to different 
realizations of 1 – . By Jensen’s inequality, the average of these equilibrium points will lie to 
the left of the point where f = ]~[1 E , which is the solution under incomplete information. 
Thus, when f is concave, complete information results in less pumping. By contrast, if f is convex 
the average of the equilibrium points under complete information lies to the right of the pumping 
level under complete information.  In this case, complete information results in more pumping. 
The following examples illustrate. 
 
Example 1. (Stock and pumping cost externality under risk-neutrality)  Suppose that farmers are 
risk-neutral and the period net benefit of water use is given by  
uuxcbuauxug )5.01(5.0),( 2  2)(5.0))1(( ucbuxca  ,  
where cbacb  2 , 25.0 buau    is yield (output price is normalized to one), and  
 
u
dzzxcuuxc
0
)1()5.01(  is the pumping cost that increases with the initial depth from 
the land surface to the water table, x1 , and the quantity of water extracted, u .  Then the 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is ))()(/1()( ucbauf    ))(/( ucbba   and 
0)(
))((
))(2(2
)(
3




ucbba
cbcbab
uf

 as cb )( . 
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Applying Proposition 3, if the quadratic term, b, is large (small) relative to marginal pumping 
costs, c , complete information will lead to more (less) pumping in period 1. ■ 
Example 2. (Stock externality under risk-aversion)  In the case where net benefits do not depend 
on the water stock 0),( xugx , f   ( )0  reduces to   
(19) 2))1()()(()1()( uAuAuAuA   ]1,5.0[u , 
where )(uA )(/)( ugug uuu  is the index of concavity of )(ug .  Then we can interpret u  as 
monetary income (a linear function of water use), )(ug  as the periodic utility of income, and 
)(uA is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion.  It is standard to assume that the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth.  If A  is not too convex (or is 
concave), (19) holds with “” sign, and f will be a convex function. Thus, by Proposition 3, 
farmers pump more, on average, when they have more precise information about the 
environment. For example, (19) is satisfied with “” sign for some commonly used utility 
functions such as 2)2/(),( uauxug  , auexug ),( , or )ln(),( uxug  . 
However, this property is not true of all utility functions. For example, for preferences 
that are characterized by constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), i.e., uug )( , )1,0( , (19) 
may hold with either sign and so f may be either convex or concave.
10
  In the CRRA case, 
absolute risk aversion is decreasing and convex in wealth, )1()( uAuA   ]1,5.0[u , and 
(19) holds with “ ” for 2/1 u , and “ ” for  2/1 u .  And so, more information may 
affect pumping in either direction, depending on the degree of risk aversion. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3, which plots the average pumping under complete and incomplete information 
(when 1 ) as a function of  .  In case (a), the speed of lateral flows takes values 0  and 
5.0  with equal probability.  In case (b), the speed of lateral flows is uniformly distributed on 
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]5.0,0[ .  Of course, pumping rates under incomplete information are identical in case (a) and (b) 
because the average speed of lateral flows is the same, 25.0]~[ E .  Also, the efficient pumping 
rate is 5.01, 
s
iu .  Farmers pump more under complete information if farmers are sufficiently 
risk-averse, 615.0 .  However, the extent of the discrepancy due to private information is 
relatively small.  If the farmers are weakly risk-averse (  is close to 1), they pump less under 
complete information and the extent of the discrepancy is larger.  
[Figure 3 about here]  
5.2. Welfare comparison 
In the previous section, we showed that the effect of uncertainty about the hydrologic properties 
of groundwater on the average pumping in period 1 depends on the curvature of the ratio of 
marginal benefits of irrigation.  The effect of this uncertainty on expected welfare is somewhat 
more subtle because welfare depends not only on the average deviation of equilibrium pumping 
from the efficient allocation but also on the higher moments of its distribution.  Let )(u  
)1,1()1,( uugug    denote the discounted profits attained by allocating water equally 
across farmers.  The following result identifies the precise condition under which welfare is 
reduced or enhanced by providing better information to users. 
 
Proposition 4. (Information and welfare) Suppose that the ratio of the marginal benefits of 
groundwater in period 1 and 2 satisfies  
(20) 
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
u
u
uf
uf







 )]5.0(),1([ 11  ffu .   
Then non-cooperative farmers attain, on average, lower (higher) expected welfare under 
complete information about the speed of lateral flows, i.e., ])~[()()]~([  EE ii  . 
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Proof:  By (16b) and (18b), the effect of incomplete information on the expected welfare 
depends on the curvature of )( i )1),(())((  ugu  ))(1),(1(  uug  , where 
  )1()( 1  fu )]5.0(),1([ 11  ff  ]5.0,0[ .  Differentiation yields 
 dud i /))(( ))((/))((  ufu  0 .  Differentiating twice yields  
 
2
2 ))((


d
ud i
2))((
))((
)
))((
))((
))((
))((
(






uf
u
uf
uf
u
u







0)(  
depending on whether for )(/)()()(/)( uuufuf    )]5.0(),1([ 11  ffu  since 
0))((   u  for ]5.0,0[ .  Hence, the result follows by Jensen’s inequality. ■ 
 
Note that ff  /  is an index of concavity of a (decreasing) function f .  And so, the 
effect of information on producer income depends on whether the ratio of the marginal benefits, 
)(uf ))]1,1()1,1((/[)1,( xuguugug xuu   , is less (more) concave than the sum of the 
benefits, )1,1()1,()( uugugu   , when water is allocated equally across farmers.  The 
producer profit depends on information only via its impact on the pumping rates, which, in turn, 
can be decomposed into two components.  First, better information always increases the 
variability of the pumping rates across farmers with different realizations of ~ .  As a result, 
because the average value of ~  is unchanged, and the marginal benefits of water are decreasing, 
the expected profits tend to decrease.  Second, better information may lead to, on average, 
allocations either closer to or farther from the efficient allocation (i.e. less or more pumping in 
period 1).  Smaller (greater) average pumping rates in period 1 tend to raise (lower) the expected 
profit.  
Condition (20) in Proposition 4 can be related to the simpler convexity condition in 
Proposition 3. In particular, convexity of f is a sufficient condition for (20) to hold with “”, 
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because in this case )(/)( ufuf   0 )(/)( uu   , where the inequalities follow from the facts 
that )(uf  is decreasing and )(u  is concave and decreasing for siuu 1, .  Thus, if f is convex, 
then complete information unambiguously causes pumping to increase (Proposition 3) and 
welfare to fall (Proposition 4). Welfare falls because pumping rates become more variable and 
shift, on average, further from the efficient allocation.  
In contrast, concavity of f is not sufficient for (20) to hold with “.” If f is concave, better 
information induces farmers to reduce pumping on average (Proposition 3), thereby bringing 
pumping rates closer to the efficient solution.  However, the welfare loss associated with added 
variability of pumping rates due to better information about local conditions may outweigh the 
average gain in welfare.  Only if f  is “sufficiently” concave, will expected welfare increase 
under more information.  The following examples illustrate. 
 
Example 3. (Stock and pumping cost externality under risk-neutrality) Consider the same 
environment as in Example 1.  If the quadratic component of the production function is large 
relative to marginal pumping costs, cb   and f  is convex, then, by Proposition 4, farmers’ 
expected welfare is lower under complete information.  So suppose that cb  , and also let 
1 .  Then the condition in Proposition 4 becomes 
)(
)(
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)(
)(
2
)(
)(
u
u
uucbba
cb
uf
uf













, or  
)(3
2
)(
bc
cba
u


  for )]3/()(,5.0[ cbbau  . 
This condition holds with sign “ ” for )3/()()5.0(1 cbbafu    if cb 3 .  And so, if the 
quadratic component is “sufficiently” small (i.e. 3/cb  ), and ~  is known to take values close 
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to 0.5 (so that ciu 1,  and 
n
iu 1,   are close to )5.0(
1f ), farmers’ expected welfare is higher under 
better information. ■ 
  
Example 4. (Stock externality under risk-aversion) Consider the same environment as in 
Example 2.  Figure 4 illustrates the effect of information on the expected farmer profits in case 
(a).  Farmers are worse off under complete information, ])~[()]~([  EE ii  , if they are 
sufficiently risk averse, 8615.0 .  On the other hand, if the marginal benefits of irrigation are 
approximately constant, farmers are, on average, better off when they are able to adjust pumping 
rates in response to the local hydrological properties, ])~[()]~([  EE ii  .  
[Figure 4 about here]  
Table 1 summarizes the comparison of pumping rates and farmer welfare by combining 
the results in Figures 3(a) and 4. 
 [Table 1 about here] 
6. Model Extensions and Discussion 
To isolate the role of information about the local hydrologic properties, we consider the simplest 
possible dynamic spatial setting with (i) a two-cell aquifer, (ii) two periods, (iii) identical 
producers, and (iv) either complete or no information.  The derived conclusions are robust to 
some but not all of these simplifying assumptions.  For example, the results can be easily 
extended to the case when farmers observe a signal that provides partial but not complete 
information about the local hydrologic properties of the aquifer such as porosity and storativity.  
Then the informativeness of signals can be ranked based on the sensitivity of the conditional 
expected value of the likely speed of lateral flows to the observed signal.  This criterion is less 
restrictive than the Blackwell’s [2] sufficient statistic approach.  Also, the analysis carries over 
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with only slight modifications to the case of multiple users as long as they are symmetric as in 
Eswaran and Lewis [7]. 
The analysis of the effect of better information about the environment on equilibrium 
allocation in a more realistic setting, where one or more of conditions (i) – (iii) are relaxed, is 
more complicated.  In a multi-cell aquifer, it is likely that equilibrium pumping rates differ 
across, even otherwise identical, farmers.  In particular, it can be shown that farmers that are 
closer to the center of the aquifer pump groundwater faster than farmers that are farther away 
(however, this relationship may not be monotone).  Therefore, incompleteness of information has 
potentially important distributional consequences across farms.   
In a multi-period setting, information about the hydrology of the region impacts not only 
the speed of pumping but also the useable lifetime of the aquifer. Consider an environment with 
infinite time-horizon, limited entry, diminishing marginal product of water, per period fixed cost, 
0),0(  Fxg , and no recharge.  Then it can be shown that the lifetime of the aquifer may 
increase or decrease when producers are better informed about the speed of lateral flows 
depending on the properties of the water benefits and the discount factor.  Allowing for a 
rechargeable aquifer does not change the results as long as the statistic of interest is the time 
before the level of groundwater in the aquifer falls below a certain level. 
The result that the better information about the extent of interconnectedness among the 
users has an ambiguous effect on the efficiency also extends to renewable resources such as 
fisheries.
11
  In the simplest setting where the rate of growth does not depend on the density of 
biomass (fish population) and the biomass dispersal is proportional to the difference in 
biomasses across locations, the equations of motion between the two locations (patches), (2), 
become: 
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 ))1()1)(1(()( 1,21,11,11,12,1 uuaQuxax   ,
 ))1)(1()1(()( 1,21,11,21,22,2 uuaQuxax   , 
where 01a  is the rate of growth of a renewable resource (e.g., fish population).  This 
formulation presumes that the time during which the resource is extracted is short compared with 
the time that elapses between the episodes of extraction.  Then all of our results continue to hold 
if we redefine the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution as
12
  
( ,1)
( ; )
[ ( (1 ), (1 )) ( (1 ), (1 ))]
u
u x
g u
f u a
g a u a u g a u a u

    
. 
Finally, suppose that the users that are located in area overlying the aquifer are 
heterogeneous in their derived demand for groundwater due to the differences in acreage, soil 
types, availability of surface water, environmental regulations, etc. Then they likely have 
different incentives to achieve a more dynamically efficient allocation and to learn more about 
the hydrologic properties of the groundwater resource.  Another important possibility not 
explored in this paper is that farmers have asymmetric information: some producers may be 
better informed about the local hydrologic properties than others.  Understanding the effect of 
private and public information on natural resource exploitation in the framework that 
incorporates these and other realistic features is left for future research. 
 
7. Conclusions and Implications 
 
This paper departs from the existing literature by allowing for incomplete information 
among groundwater users.  Because it is patently unrealistic to assume that producers have 
perfect knowledge of the local hydrologic properties, we ask the question: What is the effect of 
incomplete information about the speed of lateral groundwater flows on equilibrium pumping 
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rates and producer welfare? We find that the answer depends on rather subtle properties of the 
production technology as well as the nature of uncertainty about the speed of lateral flows.   
A somewhat counter-intuitive finding is that the effect of information on water use and 
welfare may be of opposite signs. This can be understood as a consequence of spatial variability. 
If better information becomes available, users in different locations will either increase or 
decrease extraction rates, depending on whether the newly learned spatial interactions are 
stronger or weaker than initially believed. In the areas where resource extraction increases 
dramatically, welfare will fall sharply. Due to the concavity of the net benefits function, even if 
extraction rates decrease on average, thereby bringing the system as a whole closer to the 
efficient path, expected welfare may fall. This implies that (unobservable) changes in welfare 
cannot be directly inferred from (observable) changes in resource extraction rates.  
Users’ beliefs about spatial externalities are a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy: if users 
believe externalities are small or non-existent, they will behave accordingly, and resource use 
will be approximately efficient. It is in the cases where users believe externalities are significant 
where policies must be designed with care. Educating and informing users about the true 
resource dynamics in such cases may actually accelerate their extraction rates. That is, better 
information is not a substitute for correcting the underlying externalities. As in other cases where 
incomplete information aggravates other distortions, better information will be unambiguously 
welfare-improving only if the distortions are eliminated first.   
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Figure 1.  Hydrology of groundwater 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Equilibrium groundwater pumping and profits 
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a) Two-point probability distribution of ~  
 
b) Uniform probability distribution of ~  
Figure 3.  Pumping, risk aversion, and information  
 
  
Figure 4.  Profit, risk aversion, and information about the hydrology 
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Table 1.  The average pumping rates in period 1, profits, and information 
 
Range in  
Degree of risk 
aversion 
Effect of complete information on: 
Pumping                    Welfare 
(0, 0.62) High Increase Decrease 
(0.62, 0.86) Moderate Decrease Decrease 
(0.86, 1) Low Decrease Increase 
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NOTES 
 
1
 A typical study was that of Kim [15], who applied the basic model to the Texas High Plains 
based on empirically estimated water demand functions, and also modified the model to allow 
users to plant different irrigated crops as the aquifer declines. The estimated welfare gains from 
optimal management were quite small (less than 3.7%). Similarly small gains were found by 
several other authors including Allen and Gisser, Nieswiadomy, and Fienerman and Knapp 
[1,18,8]. See Koundouri [16] for a more comprehensive review.  
2
 For example, Provencher and Burt [21] identified two distinct externalities from their 
equilibrium conditions. First, the pumping cost externality arises because consumption by one 
user lowers the water table and raises pumping costs for other users. Second, the stock 
externality reflects the costs that one user imposes others because his consumption reduces their 
future water availability.  
3
 There is a large literature that investigates the value of information in various environments.  
An important early contribution is Hirschleifer [13] who demonstrated that in an exchange 
economy the value of information may be negative.  Eckwert and Zilcha [6] show that 
sufficiently risk-averse agents may become worse off under better information in production 
economies. Stiglitz [23] analyzes the efficiency and welfare in screening models with 
endogenous information acquisition. 
4
 LkS / , where k is hydraulic conductivity, S is the cross-sectional area of flow, L is the 
distance between wells on each farm [9].  
5
 The assumption that ),( xug  is strictly increasing in u  for all  ],0[ xu  reflects a situation of 
absolute water scarcity; all of the water remaining in period 2 will be consumed. If water is not 
scarce in this sense, so that ),( xug  is decreasing in u  for ],ˆ[ xuu , the analysis needs only minor 
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modifications.  Also, note that all our results can be obtained under a weaker technical condition 
than the joint concavity of ),( xug  on ]1,0[]1,0[   such as 0)(., xguu  and 
0),()],(),([5.0  xxgxxgxxg uxxxuu  (0,1)x  .  To interpret this condition, suppose the current 
groundwater stock is x and that all of this water is consumed in the current period (u = x).  Under 
standard assumptions on the irrigation technology [20], the cross-partial derivative term is 
positive, reflecting the fact that the marginal benefits of water use, gu, will increase with respect 
to x (e.g., due to more rapid water delivery or a smaller pumping lift).  And so, this condition 
states that g must be “sufficiently” concave in u and x, so that the cross-partial term does not 
exceed half of the bracketed term in absolute value. 
6
 There is a large variation in local hydrologic properties such as the aquifer’s storativity and 
transmissivity values as well as well-spacing requirements that vary from 4 miles in parts of 
Kansas to less than 300 feet in Texas [4,14].  
7
 Note that the concavity of g implies that f
  -1
 exists and is decreasing in u, but does not  imply 
anything about its curvature.   
8
 To verify these claims, recall first that by concavity of g, the function f  is strictly decreasing in 
u.  It follows that f
 -1
 is also a strictly decreasing function. Under the assumption that [ ]E   > 0, a 
comparison of (7) and (16a) then implies that 1 1
,1 ,1
(1) ( [ ]) (1 [ ])
s n
i i
u f u E f E 
 
    ; while (7) and 
(17a) imply that 1 1
,1 ,1
(1) ( ) (1 )
s c
i i
u f u f 
 
    if  > 0.  
9
 This assumption also appears in the GS model.  Unlike GS, however, we do not obtain 
complete rent dissipation. In our model, complete rent dissipation would correspond to ui,1 = 1, 
where all available resource rents are captured in period 1. This equilibrium cannot arise in our 
model even when  = 0.5, because 1 (0.5) 1f    if ,.)0(ug . As a reviewer pointed out, it is 
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perhaps not obvious whether this result occurs because access is restricted to 2 users, or because 
we assume that groundwater is a private resource within each season. It can be shown that in the 
case of instantaneous lateral flow with n users, the equilibrium pumping rate converges to 
,1
c
i
u  = 1 
as n   (a demonstration of this is available from the authors). Thus, rents would be fully 
dissipated in the open access limit, proving that incomplete rent dissipation occurs because of 
restricted access.  
10
 Gollier [11] discusses plausible upper bounds on the measure of relative risk aversion, 1- 
(note that =1 corresponds to risk-neutrality).   
11
 See Sanchirico and Wilen [22] (and the references cited therein) for a state-of-the-art analysis 
of spatial management of renewable resources under the assumption of perfect information. 
12
 Of course, the result that the optimal allocation does not depend on the degree of user 
interconnectedness (the properties of spatial dispersal) will not hold when users are asymmetric.  
